

~~SECRET~~TALKING PAPER FOR ADMIRAL MURPHY

This paper was prepared at your request. It provides the following talking points for your forthcoming meeting with Ed Proctor and covers three issues--secrecy and compartmentation, the balance in resource terms between collection and production, and revision involving the NIB/NID publication.

ISSUE #1. Secrecy and CompartmentationTALKING POINTS

- There is a general recognition in the Community that there are too many kinds of classification and control on intelligence documents. Analysts, collectors, disseminators and consumers are confused about what they know and don't know. The dilemma of document control specialists can be summed up by the plea from CIA's Central Reference Service: "We're running out of room on the computer." There is a problem to be solved.
- Dr. Proctor heads a task force which thus far concentrated on sanitizing finished intelligence for the consumer. A status report on that task force has been sent to you from the Security Committee (See TAB A). It appears that much remains to be done.
- The NIOs, at the DCI's request, prepared a very brief study of "the NODIS problem," designed to highlight the need for making more intelligence information acquired by the policymaker available to the intelligence analysts. It is a compelling list of horror stories. The paper, which was sent to you, was also sent by the DCI to Scowcroft. (See TAB B).
- Another aspect involves the difficulty of disseminating sensitive intelligence information reports (other than NODIS) from the collectors to the analysts--e.g., "G" material from NSA to INR and DIA; DDO reports to DIA and the Services; Navy material to CIA. IC Staff has addressed these subjects from time to time, and the lesson--unfortunately--seems to be that this disease can be contained but not cured.
- The Senate Select Committee report has some interesting, and on the whole, sensible comments on secrecy and compartmentation. It gives the Community justification for a more vigorous effort to solve the problem (See TAB C).

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- The KIQ-KEP performance evaluation also illustrates the problem in the treatment of KIQ #14, which deals with Soviet SLBM developments.
 - Problem areas encountered in responding to this KIQ were basically two, of which one was the close compartmentation of certain data. This problem was alleviated, in part, by the wider distribution of certain of the data. There still remains, however, the difficulty of disseminating to consumers meaningful finished intelligence based on those data.
 - Concerning collection where data were disseminated widely enough to permit coordinated tasking, collection tasks were substantially or almost completely satisfied; where they were not, tasks were unsatisfied).
- Among the questions you might pose to Proctor are:
 - Where can the IC Staff be most helpful on this issue?
 - Are there specific issues we can broker?

ISSUE #2. The Balance in Resource Terms Between Collection and Production.

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TALKING POINTS

- While there are obviously no simple answers as to what constitutes the "right balance" between collection and production costs, we need better definitions of the key elements that should be factored into the allocation equation.

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- Among the questions you might pose to Proctor are:
- Do ratings like 10 and 15 to 1 have any meaning? If so, are they in the right ballpark?
 - How good are the expenditure data on the analysis side of the house?
 - How can we improve our methods of deciding whether too much or too little is being spent on a particular intelligence concern? Are quantitative approaches reasonable?

ISSUE #3. Revisions Involving the National Intelligence Bulletin (NIB) and National Intelligence Daily (NID) Publications.

TALKING POINTS

- In his 12 April memo to USIB Principals (TAB D), Mr. Bush proposed that the NIB should be discontinued, citing as a reason the potential saving of several thousands of dollars.
- The IC Staff agrees in principle with the DCI proposal, and would cite as added reason the high degree (90%+) of redundancy in the content found in the NIB and NID dailies.
- The DCI's alternative proposal is, in effect, to make the NID alone do the work of both dailies, namely:
- The NID will continue in its present form with distribution to approximately 80 senior policy/decision makers.
 - Departmental needs will be met by a sanitized, cabled version of the NID, designed to meet department needs--much in the same way as the NIB which is now distributed to approximately 700 recipients. (About 350 hard copy NIBs were distributed outside CIA. The new system provides no hard copies.)
- We wish that the IC Staff had been consulted in the move to kill the NIB, since the staff was instrumental in establishing it and has played a role in its development as a Community enterprise. In any event, we now wish to be helpful in the transition to the "new NID" system.

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- We believe that it is important to explore and obviate potential problem areas that might arise in the course of producing the new NID, such as:
 - How or whether to make the new NID "a fully coordinated publication." (Comments of USIB Principals in response to the DCI's memo present several differing viewpoints concerning "full" coordination.)
 - Procedures for revamping the new NID that are satisfactory to DIA, State/INR, and NSA as well as CIA.
 - Consumer satisfaction vis-a-vis the assurance of real dollar savings.
- At some appropriate future time the IC Staff will be consulting with users to ensure the timeliness, relevancy, and quality of the new NID product.
- Among the issues you might pose to Proctor are:
 - The same general concern that you have expressed in IC Staff meetings about the general difficulty of knowing what is going on in the world. He might have procedures of his own that could be shared.
 - Additionally, you might very well trigger a discussion that could eventually make current reporting more useful to the Community.

Attachments:

- TABS A - Memo (SECOM-D-149) Status Report on Dr. Proctor's Group Studying Secrecy and Compartmentation, 28 April 1976
- B - Memo (NIO 0568/76) NODIS Cable Problem, 6 April 1976
- C - Extracts from Senate Select Committee Final Report on Foreign and Military Intelligence
- D - Memo (USIB-D-71.11/20) Current Intelligence Publications, 12 April 1976
- E - ICS Background Correspondence

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SECOM-D-149
28 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

FROM :
Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT : Status Report on Dr. Proctor's Group
Studying Secrecy and Compartmentation

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1. This memorandum is in response to your request of 27 April 1976 for information about the work Dr. Proctor's group is doing on secrecy and compartmentation.

2. Since February 1976 Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI, has been chairing a group of senior officials representing CIA, DIA, State and NSA, studying secrecy and compartmentation to develop principles and guidelines for the classification and control of intelligence. The goal of his group is to protect those aspects of intelligence sources and methods that truly deserve protection and to allow broader access to intelligence by applying the lowest appropriate classification and minimum dissemination controls. This includes declassification and release to the public.

3. Some of the major recommendations being considered by Dr. Proctor's group include:

a. To generate sufficient confidence in the present classification system to allow the judicious access to intelligence by a larger number of consumers.

b. To conduct an aggressive educational program designed to downgrade substantive intelligence to unclassified or the lowest possible classification consistent with E. O. 11652.

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c. To classify each intelligence document on its own merits and give it the dissemination controls it demands, not by "inheritance" but by an evaluation consistent with the standards of E.O. 11652 and the degree to which it truly reveals sensitive aspects of sources.

d. To release to the public intelligence which will neither jeopardize sources and methods nor damage the U.S. national security or foreign relations.

e. To obtain White House approval to downgrade to Confidential or declassify the fact that the United States Government conducts a photographic satellite reconnaissance program.

f. To obtain White House approval to authorize the DCI to implement a policy of reducing the dissemination restrictions on the photographic and signals intelligence products of the satellite reconnaissance program in a way that will not jeopardize this essential source of intelligence.

4. Dr. Proctor has requested collector agencies to furnish papers on steps they can take immediately to make more intelligence available at lower levels of classification or control. Dr. Proctor has prepared a draft letter from Mr. Bush to the President which covers 3(e) and (f).



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Chairman


Attachment

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 7 April 1976
TO: D/DCI/IC		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>The DCI handed this over to the President this morning, along with chart showing the decline in our receipt of NODIS over the last two years.</i>		
FROM: NIO/USSR		[REDACTED]
ROOM NO. 7E62	BUILDING HQ's. [REDACTED]	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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6 April 1976


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director

SUBJECT : NODIS Cable Problems

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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USIB-D-71.11/20
12 April 1976

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

6

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT : Current Intelligence Publications

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-71.11/7, 2 December 1974
b. USIB-D-71.11/6, 4 April 1974
c. USIB-M-664, 4 April 1974, Item 3

1. I have recently conducted a review of the current intelligence publications produced in CIA. This review has involved a close look at the need for individual publications as well as their format and production costs. As part of this process a representative from my Office of Current Intelligence has consulted with the principal production officers in DIA, State, and NSA.

2. My findings indicate that the daily intelligence needs of our main consumers can continue to be well served and that a substantial savings of several hundred thousand dollars can be realized by discontinuing the National Intelligence Bulletin, the procedures for which were established in the reference documents. In its place, I propose to meet departmental needs by producing a cabled version of the National Intelligence Daily.

3. More specifically, I propose that the NID become a fully coordinated publication. Late-breaking news items that cannot be coordinated will be so identified. As at present, drafting will be handled by CIA; DIA's Defense Intelligence Notices and other departmental intelligence publications will be used as the basis for some drafts. In addition, DIA, State, NSA, and CIA will be invited to submit feature articles. The feature articles will give attribution to the author and his organization and will be coordinated in substance. We will continue to require the services of representatives from the participating agencies to facilitate the coordination process and to speed the exchange of substantive information.

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4. The cabled version of the NID will carry an overall classification of TOP SECRET COMINT NOFORN, but each paragraph will be individually classified so that recipients can more easily use the information to meet their departmental needs.

5. If you have any comments please provide them to the Executive Secretary of USIB by 22 April 1976.

George Bush
Chairman

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
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24 April 1976

MEMO FOR [REDACTED]

Dick:

Please have someone from your shop
prepare a talker on this subject for
[REDACTED]

He will bring up with Ed Proctor in the
very near future.

[REDACTED]
Executive Assistant to
D/DCI/IC

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ACTION

TAB 6

22 April 1976

NOTE FOR

Dan:

This is an issue that fits square in the middleground between your view that you have total community responsibilities and the view that that is true except for "substance."


I think Ed Proctor -- one of the more reasonable of the Agency brass -- is a man worth your chatting with on several counts --

- (1) secrecy, compartmentation and the need for change,
- (2) the balance (in resource terms) between collection and production, and
- (3) this matter.


is right that we could have helped if consulted but I wouldn't make the issue -- by itself -- the sole subject of your first session with Proctor.

E. H. Knoche

MEMORANDUM FOR: **MR KNOX**
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*would like your
views regarding attached memo
from*



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Date **20 Apr 78**

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CONFIDENTIALIC 76-2287
14 April 1976*File*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

FROM:

C/IC/PAID

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SUBJECT: Discontinuation of the National Intelligence Bulletin (NIB)

The National Intelligence Bulletin has lived long enough and so we do not resist the DDI's move to kill it. But we certainly have problems with the way the death-dealing blow is being delivered--to our offspring!-- and we would have welcomed (and should have had) a chance to recommend other procedures and a different sort of memo to USIB principals.

1. In his memorandum for USIB principals of 12 April concerning current intelligence publications, Mr. Bush, in effect, announces that the National Intelligence Bulletin will be discontinued as a result of his review of the "current intelligence publications produced within CIA."

2. The NIB was put in business in June 1974 by USIB, following the development and coordination of procedures for its publication by the IC Staff. Your predecessor, General Graham, was the "father" of the NIB, which he and Mr. Colby saw as a DCI- and USIB-sponsored Community enterprise. (There is no CIA seal on the cover of the NIB; rather, there is a USIB logo.) It was not intended to be, and in fact was not, a CIA publication, though the Office of Current Intelligence served as the DCI's "executive agent" and handled the production of the NIB.

3. The NIB worked as a Community product, but not very well. State/INR coordinated but did not participate in the editing and did not contribute items; DIA provided an editor and wrote articles for

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publication, and so did NSA. But we (who have had to monitor the NIB account and arbitrate disputes between the agencies concerned) can testify that no one was ever very happy about the NIB as a joint effort.* Neither DIA nor NSA felt that they were getting a fair deal from the "CIA management" of the NIB; the "CIA management" rarely felt that DIA and NSA contributions were up to the standards of quality and completeness required for a national intelligence daily; and, to a degree, analysts in all three agencies resented the need to prepare current intelligence items for yet another publication. Few in any of these agencies will mourn the passing of the NIB, and it is true, as the memo states, that OCI consulted with (unresisting) production officers in DIA, State, and NSA before drafting the memo for the DCI's signature.

4. We proposed in a memorandum to the DCI of 11 June 1974 (signed by General Graham) that the NIB and NID should eventually be merged, because their contents were largely redundant and it was expensive to publish both dailies.** Mr. Colby agreed in principle at the time. We repeated the recommendation "in public" in our RONI of February 1975. We, thus, have no problem, in principle, with the DCI's proposal. We do have some problems, however, with the DCI's memo (as drafted by DDI folk), partly because it makes no bow whatsoever to the Community character of the publication. The recent Executive Order clearly strengthens the DCI's authority

*Just a month ago, for example, a senior NSA officer approached us with complaints about what he construed to be the misuse of some NSA contributions to the NIB; we looked into this for him, he had a good point, and we discussed the matter with the NIB editor-in-chief, who was cooperative and who in effect promised improvements in procedures.

**Specifically, we suggested that a merged NID and NIB "would retain the title and character of the former, the Community coordination philosophy of the latter, and the readership of both." Instead of a sanitized cable version designed to meet "departmental needs"--as now foreseen by the DDI and DCI--we proposed that "any material in the merged publication which was too highly classified or for other reasons deemed suitable only for the highest-level audience could be published separately (on, for example, a single NID-size page bearing its own classification) and inserted only in those copies of the NID sent to that particular audience."

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for the production of national intelligence, and this is reflected in the tone of his memo to the USIB principals. But we would have urged, had we been consulted, that the memo at least acknowledge USIB participation in the birth of this publication and USIB contributions to an honest effort to breathe life into a Community infant. Indeed, we would have given the memo a less final tone in general (i. e., made it clear that this was a proposal rather than a decision) on the grounds that there clearly was no need in this instance to assert authority.

5. We also feel that the DDI was remiss in not discussing this matter with you, not only because that would have been the courteous and sensible way to proceed, but also because the D/DCI/IC (usually through PRD) has exercised an acknowledged responsibility for monitoring the progress of the NIB as an Intelligence Community issuance. [redacted] the Deputy Director of OCI, was aware of the IC Staff's interest in this matter (and was reminded of it, both by [redacted] of the USIB Secretariat and [redacted] of NSA), but did not get in touch with us concerning this matter at any time. Thus, we were: (a) surprised, (b) embarrassed, (c) denied the opportunity to suggest procedures for the "new" NID, and (d) also denied the opportunity to help shape the memo which went out to the USIB principals.

6. I recommend that you express your displeasure to Mr. Proctor and that I express mine to [redacted]. I think, in addition, that we should encourage DIA, State/INR, and NSA to consult with us concerning coordination issues and other problems likely to attend the revamping of the NID.



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- 1 - IC/Registry
- 3 - IC/PAID

RWS:mjs

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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached is a Talking Paper, as requested (TAB E), for use in forthcoming discussions with Ed Proctor.

Actually, this is more than a talking paper -- it also provides you with useful background on three issues of current concern. This good work was done mostly by

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ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Chief, PAID

30 April

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